the trust envelope for autonomous systems

Safety is not an opinion. It's a measurement.

Four gates around every autonomous agent — what it may DO, what it may CONSUME, whether its work was honest, what it put on the wire — all running the same algebra: near but not attested.

4 gates do · consume · work · wire
1 algebra near but not attested
1 auth granted UCAN, all four capabilities
0 opinions safety is a measurement, not a review
realsafe · four-gate trace
> agent calls tool: pip install reqeusts

The insight

Every agent attack is near something legitimate

A prompt-injected tool call sits near an authorized one. A hallucinated package name sits near a real one — one transposed letter away from a package you already trust. A fabricated success report sits near the work that was actually done. A covert C2 channel sits near ordinary telemetry. None of these look wrong. They look approximately right — and that is exactly why they get through. "Near" is measurable. RealSafe measures it.

The four gates

Every surface an agent touches, gated

Each gate owns one attack surface and one question. All four report to the same identity and the same verdict language.

attack surface tool abuse · capability escalation · prompt-injected actions
mechanism

granted UCAN mint + constraint-aware tool execution (tool.execute.request, zero-trust AMCP) + VSA permission fingerprint

the law

an action within attested capability scope passes; an action merely similar to one is refused

status live
One algebra

Near but not attested

attack ≈ legitimate ∧ attack ∉ attested an attack is approximately legitimate ∧ absent from the attested corpus

near

Hypervector cosine similarity — the same binding/bundling algebra in all four gates. A 10,000-dimension encoding of the action, package, deliverable, or packet is compared against the attested corpus. Distance is a number, not a judgment call.

not attested

Membership in the corpus is exact, not fuzzy. The corpus is the SBOM you shipped, the capability set you minted, the witnesses that signed the work, the custody chain on the wire. If it is not in the corpus, near is not good enough — near is the suspicion.

why one product family

Because it is the same instrument measuring four surfaces. The gates are not four tools stapled together; they are four probes into one detector. That is why they train together, fail loudly together, and settle together.

The pipeline

Mint once. Gated everywhere.

01
mint granted issues one UCAN carrying all four capabilities — do, consume, work, wire
02
attest each surface gets its corpus: capability set, SBOM, witness set, custody chain
03
measure at runtime, every action is encoded and compared: near? in corpus?
04
verdict attested → pass. near-but-absent → flag. far-from-everything → block and log
05
settle work that passed settles; work that failed forfeits. the deterrent is economic
FAQ

Fair questions

One product family with four gates. The same hypervector algebra measures capability scope, package identity, work quality, and traffic shape. One auth (a granted UCAN) carries all four capabilities. Sell it as one envelope, deploy gate by gate.

The envelope

Deploy the gates. Close the envelope.

Gate by gate or all four at once — one identity, one verdict language, one algebra. An agent inside the envelope is measured; an agent outside it is a liability.

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